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The twentieth century has seen the demise of nonphysical theo
ries ofmind. The Cartesian tradition of mind-body dualism accord
ing to which "the natures ofmind and body are acknowledged to be
not only diverse but even, in a manner of speaking, to be the
contraries of one another," (Descartes, p. 8), today seems quaint to
most thinkers. Although a few contemporary theorists continue to
embrace Descartes' view that mind is a nonphysical substance that
interacts with the (physical) human body,! arguments against dual
ism "have moved most ... of the professional community to embrace
some form of materialism" (Churchland, p. 21).
"Materialism," or "physicalism," is the position that takes our
modern scientific worldview seriously. The position assumes that
humans fall unproblematically into the biological world of trees,
flowers, fish, monkeys and amoeba. The biological world is in tum
explainable in terms of the dances of elementary bits of matter and
the forces which play roles in their interaction. "The message of the
last 300 years of science is that ultimately we--and all else-are
nothing but swarms of particles" (Sterelny, p. 2).2
Thus phYSicalism forces us to conclude that human minds-like
human bodies-fall squarely in the domain of our physical theories.
The phenomena we call "mental" are on an ontological par with the
activities of squid, radia tion and bricks; the entities are different onIy
in organization and complexity.3
However popular among contemporary philosophers and scienUttle is a junior majoring in philosophy alld psychology at Transylvania University. He
plans to pursue a doctorate ill plJilosophy and teach at the ulliversity level.
Namely John Eccles (1979, 1980) and Karl Popper (d. in Eccles 1980).
One should remember. though, that the terms of physics change with empiri
cal and tileoretical developments. (d. ].J.e. Smart: "By 'materialism' I mean the
theory tilat there is nothing in the world over and above those entities which are
postulated by physics (or, of course, those entities which will be postulated by future
and more adequate physical theories)" (p. 159, italics mine).
3 But the "only" here should not be read as diminutive; these differences should
not be taken lightly. The human brain is host to over 50 billion neurons and trillions
of interneuronal connections. For more on the importance of the boggling power of
the human organ of thought, see Dennett's "Fast Thinking" (IS, pp. 323--337).
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tists, the dominant strains of physicalism have been resisted by some
non-dualist theorists as patently wrong or, at best, incomplete. 4
These philosophers fear that the materialist position leaves out
something important about our nature and in so doing presents an
incomplete picture of the world. These thinkers challenge the notion
that contemporary science is able fully to explain the universe, for,
they claim, the concepts ofmodem science are in principIe unable to
subsume certain facts that we know or intuit to be true-facts which
center on the mlnd-body problem in philosophy.
This essay deals with a prominent exponent of this hesitancy
toward physicalism, Thomas Nagel. In a series of essays and books,
Nagel has developed his position around the issue of subjectivity.
The problem is one of opposition between subjective
and objective points of view. There is a tendency to
seek an objective account of everything before admit
ting its reality. But often what appears to a more
subjective point of view cannot be accounted for in
this way (MQ, p. 196).
My work here focuses on evaluating the import for phYSicalism of
Nagel's concerns about subjectivity. My treatment of the issue
breaks into two tasks: first, identifying and describing the various
senses of subjectivity that Nagel finds problematic for physicaJism,
and second, sketching a possible salve for the quandary elicited by
each sense. I hope in this way to answer the following question by the
end of the paper: Does subjectivity pose an intractable problem for a

modern physicalist worldview?
My approach relies on the notion that one can make progress on
even seemingly big problems when steps are taken to identify
manageabIe parts. By taking those steps in this paper, I hope at least
to point the way toward an ultimate reconciliation between Nagel's
notion of subjectivity and physicalism-a useful enterprise even if
the reader fails to accept my own formulations for this feat.

4 I shall not deal here with contemporary dualists. I take their positions to be
obviously untenable for reasons any cursory look at the materialist literature will
reveaL

NAGEL, PHYSICALISM AND SUBJECTIVITY

61

The first sense: Intraspecies Subjectivity
On Nagel's view, we miss something when we describe a person
in the objective terms ofphysics. The thing that physical descriptions
leave out is "the internal element ..."which "remains, even if ignored,
as the true source of persistent dissatisfaction with all physical or
other external theories of the mind" (MQ, p. 202). Nagel thinks that
this internal feature of subjective experience "cannot be captured by
the purified form of thought suitable for dealing with the physical
world that underlies the appearances" (VN, p.lS). Subjective expe
rience for Nagel includes such phenomena as "raw feels" and "inten
tional mental states" (VN, p. 15).
So, on a first pass, Nagel seems concerned about what philoso
phers call "qualia."5 The debate about qualia-the intrinsic proper
ties of our sense experience which physical descriptions somehow
cannot capture-is familiar to all of us. In fact, many ofus discovered
the "qualia problem" in childhood. If you ever wondered whether
what you call "red" might be seen as "green" to me, internally, then
you hit on the puzzle. Or, if you ever found yourself troubled that
what I call "pain"mightnotfeel the same as what you call "pain," you
were uncovering a similar difficulty. Even though we might point to
the same things when we say "red," or we might say we feel "pain"
in aU the same circumstances (perhaps whenever we have our teeth
drilled), it seems impossible to say whether my "red" or "pain" is the
same-has the same "qualia"-as your "red" or "pain."
But if our qualia are not fixed by reference to our behavior, how
can physics, the science of behavior par excellence, ever capture what
is it to see "red" or feel "pain"? Even if we possessed full neurophysi
ological descriptions of the brain states involved in the instantiations
of these qualia, how would we say in physical terms what it was like
to "see red" or "feel paln"? In fact this seems what Nagel has in mind
in asserting tha t

5 Here I group "raw feels" and "intentional mental states" together. Strictly
speaking, the term "quale" is used in the literature to refer only to "the intrinsic
qualitative nature ... that is revealed in introspection" (Churchland, p. 24) of
sensations. However, I think that much of what seems irreducible to physical terms
in the notion of "intention" might be characterized in terms of qualia.
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the subjective character of experience ... is not
analyzable in terms of any explanatory system of
functional states, or intentional states, since these
could be ascribed to robots or automata that behaved
like people although they experienced nothing (WLB,
p.436).
The subjectivity problem, then, is first of all an intraspecies
problem: How can we say anything about the character of our
subjective human mentalstates-like feeling pain and seeingcolor
by using the predicates of physics? How could a description like
"neuron 800,456 is firing- you are seeing red" capture anything
close to what I mean when I say I see "red"?
We could answer this question in at least two ways. A first
possibility is to take the position that, because we cannot say much
about qualia (try describing what "red" looks like), they prove too
flimsy and informationally poor to matter to physics (or artificial
intelligence, by the way). A subset of this view might hold that the
idea of qualia as entities, as something real, is misguided-there
really are no such things as "painness" or "redness" left over whenwe
explain your "pain feeling" or "red feeling" in terms of your physical
design and functioning (Dennett takes this view in his brilliant work
on consciousness (eE, pp. 369-411». These stances on quaHa are
ingenious, plausible and perhaps true. But they are also counter
intuitive and controversiaL Nagel seems correct in saying "our origi
nal concept [of pain} already picks the thing out by an essential
feature ..." (VN, p. 47) Ifhe is correct, then we must account for qualia
in some way, and primajacie we might have to accept Nagel's "a priori
da im that the mental cannot be reduced to or analyzed in terms of the
physical" (VN, p. 48).
As a second way of approaching the qualia problem, suppose
that Nagel is right about the irreducibility of phenomena like "pain"
and "redness." Does it follow ilia t physicalism is false or incomp lete?
The answer seems to be no, and it is helpful to tum to Nager sown
defirution of physicalism to see why: "I mean by physicalism the
thesis that a person, with all his psychological attributes, is nothing
over and above his body, with all its physical attributes" (P, p. 214).
The tenability of the thesis seems to depend on the class of the
"physical." If we could expand this class to include such things as
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"pains"and"redness,"wewouldbeabletoassertaphysicalismwhlch
covered many of the "psychological attributes" Nagel worries about.
And why not? Many phenomena these days are "physical"
which our scientific ancestors would have rejected as patently non
physical or even supernatural. Nagel himself notes this:
Electricity and magnetism could not be analyzed in
terms of mechanical concepts of matter in motion.
...The shift from the universe of Newton to the uni
verse of Maxwell required the development of a
whole new set of concepts and theories ... specifically
devised to describe and explain these newly explored
phenomena (VN, p. 52).
Explaining qualia like pain and redness would require new equa
tions which would explain under what physical conditions the
qualia-themselves physical-would appear, but this should strike
one as no more difficult than describing the phenomenon of, say, life.
Ofcourse, it is a challenge, to understate things a bit, to describe what
physical conditions produce life. But we have good theories in this
arena. We know, for example, that mammals require oxygen, water
and some form offood to supply the raw materials for Jiving; we also
know much about the .processes through
which animals use these
.
raw materials and excrete waste products. In addition, we possess
elaborate cellular theories of the conception find development of
these organisms.
"But none ofthat explains 'life,'" rhear a critic say, "It just tells us
the conditions for life." The last part seems to me a true statement,
and exactly why science has (or has begun to) "explain" life. We
"understand" life in a "scientific" way because we know what
physical conditions must hold for a thing to live, just as we under
stand ocean waves in a scientific way because we know what
physical conditi.ons must be satisfied in order for frothy waves to roll
onto the beach. One could claim that these "explanations" really do
not get at the "oceanness" or "waveness" of the ocean waves, or the
"Hfeness" of Hving things, but that would be to misunderstand the
mission of science.
Nagel even seems to see the possibility for admitting qualia into
the world of physics, but he cryptically rejects it:
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Some may think there is nothing to prevent mental
phenomena from eventually being recognized as
physical in their own right. ... It seems to me more
likely. however, that mental-physical relations will
eventually be expressed in a theory whose funda
mental terms cannot be placed clearly in either cat
egory (WLB. pp. 449-50).
And what would these new fundamental terms be? Scientific revo
lution after scientific revolution, we have not failed to call new
concepts "physical"; why should mental phenomena be party to a
different fate?
I do not have the space here for a detailed discussion of the
philosophy of scientific explanation. Instead. I offer at least a plau
sible diagnosis ofNagel'shesitancywhenitcomes to "physicalizing"
qualia. We tend to fall into what I call the "roll, bump. thud"
characterization of physiCS. According to this view. the identifying
characteristic of the "physical" is that it is made of "stuff"-stuff that
goes "roll. bump, thud" or is composed of components which fit this
description. Tables. bricks. water, atoms andbrains all£allneatlyinto
this designation of "physical."
But the problem is that "physics" seems to use a quite different
conception of "the physical." Instead of the above commonsense
notion of a "category of composition" (according to which "physical
ness" is a matter ofw hat something is made of). physics seems to rely
on a "category of predictability" when postulating or describing
physical objects. Following the boundaries circumscribed by this
category, physics admits entities into the category "physical" which
best explain phenomena under observation. For example, X-Rays
were posited as a physical entity before anyone knew "what they
were made of" (better: "how to fit them into our present theoretical
framework or how to change the framework to admit the new
phenomena").
In this way. it seems that we might indeed admit qualia like
"redness" and "pain" into our physical worldview. All we would
need would be ways of ordering or systematizing the phenomena
which we give these labels. Although this would perhaps be a
humbling task, we already possess the beginnings of this theory (for
example, I can say with certainty that the quale "pain" will take place

NAGEL, PHYSICALISM AND SUBJECTIVITY

65

in fellow humans with normal nervous systems if a lighted match is

held next to their skin. 6 Of course, what makes this an intraspecies
problem is that we get the data of our new physical pain and redness
theories by being members of a type of biological class the members
of which possess similar physical structure. This similarity of physi
cal structure allows us to generalize from our experience of "pain" to
the quality of the experience of another member of the species.
At this point, it might prove helpful to step back and summarize
the analYSis so far. First I claimed that Nagel's problem with subjec
tivity on the intraspecies level has something to do with the apparent
futility of describing qualia in physical terms. Next I showed how
even if we accept the commonsense notions of "pains" and "color
qualities" as "real" instead of dismissing them as misguided or
trivial-qualia can plausibly be "physicalized. "7 But if qualia pose no
threat to physicalism, what is left of the intraspecies subjectivity
problem?
Something does seem to be left. After looking at my analysis of
qualia, someone will say, "But surely my experience as a human is
not composed just of qualia-these are too simple to describe the
richness ofmy subjective experience. How could a physics-€ven one
that admitted qualia-explain all that richness"?
I will attempt to shake the intuitive significance of this residual
richness by introducing two further concerns linked to intraspecies
subjectivity: the first deals with the nature of human subjective ex
perience, and thesecondisanotherpoint about scientific exp]ana tion.
The first point begins wi th an explana tion of a phenomenon I cn11
the "intermodal fallacy."s Although it may be surprising, the degree
to which our sense experience seems subjective is related to which
Q I know this because even Nagel, who hilS doubts about the complete/JeSs of
physicalism, can contradict physicalism only ilt the risk of absurdity. That is, he
would not want to claim that structurally congruent physical entities subjected to
identical stimuli could harbor significantly different reactions. To claim that they
could would be to take stock in nn intervening variable-and whnt would it be?
"Mind stuff" is not an a ttrnctiv€ answer for NageL
7We mightnotwantto take this route, of course-the demands mightprove too
taxing. I just want to point out the possibility for this avenue, which is more than
Nagel will allow.
S Recently I found that Dennett makes an observation along the Silme lines (CE,
pp. 380-81); however, he makes the point in passing and seems not to give the
phenomenon the credit I think it deserves.
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sense modality we talk about; some sensory channels seem to give us
more "objective" data than others do. For example, imagine visiting
an art gallery with a friend. On the wall hangs a large oil painting by
Salvador Dali. You talk with your friend about the symbolism of the
wilted trees and fanciful human-like figures, and discuss everything
from the role of shading in Dali's presentation to the importance of
the play of various types of angles in the work. But then your friend
has an idea. "No one is around, so why don'twe see how the painting
feels?" The ensuing conversation is markedly impoverished.

- "It feels ... well, it feels 'rough' here and 'smooth'
here."
- "No, it feels more 'grainy' than 'rough.'"
- "Yes, well, how do you know what 'rough' feels
like to me?"
Far from treating Dali's "aesthetics of touch," your conversation

never gets off the ground. And, curiously, whereas your discussion
about what you see runs only into problems of differences in artistic
judgment, your discussion of tactile impressions turns into a full

I

blown metaphysical quagmire; in fact, it is the problem of qualia all
over again. One sense modality seems more objective than another, I
buthowisthispossible? Are not all the senses on one ontological par? '
Why do they seem to admit different degrees of subjectivity?
Many explanations suggest themselves, but I will deal only with
two of the most obvious. First, human vision has a finer "grain" than
human touch. Each normal human retina is host to about 132 million
photoreceptors linked in an elaborate network of connecting cells
(Foley and Matlin, p. 59). However, the human hand has the benefit
of only several thousand receptors for touch (Foley and Matlin, p.
370). Second-and this is probably a corollary to the physiology of
vision and touch-the human visual vocabulary seems much larger
than the human tactile vocabulary. These possibilities corroborate a
larger point: perhaps our sense of subjectivity exhibits an inverse
relationship with the richness of the sensory data to which we have
access. If this is the case, the intraspecies subjectivity problem might
have to do more with weak sensory vocabularies and apparatuses
than with an ontological dilemma.
An analysis of the intermodal fallacy thus poses the following
I

NAGEL, PHYSICALISM AND SUBJECTIVITY

67

interesting idea: if lack of a rich sensory vocabulary is much of the
intraspecies subjectivity problem, we might be able to eliminate it
altogether by admitting our sense qualia to the physical world and
developing sophisticated new "vocabularies"-in the form of com
plex descriptions of the physical conditions for the phenomena. This
program would indeed seem possible.
However, one still might object that this program of systematiz
ing intra species qualia must in principle still miss much of the
complexity of human perceptual experience. "Surely," one might
say, "the richness of my experience is not captured in my vocabu
lary-even in my relatively rich visual vocabulary." This critic
would of course be absolutely correct, but with no Significant conse
quence for a physical theory of perceptual experience; explaining
this point requires a discussion of another interesting observation
about scientific explanation.
When it comes to talking about our perceptions, we seem to
employ two senses of "experience," E(l) and E(2):
E(l): A clear yet incomplete notion
E(2): A rich, complete, yet vague notion

When we look at a "red" car and see "redness," when we see a clock
and notice that it appears "round," or when we hit our thumb with
a hammer and feel "a throbbing pain," we are employing the concept
"experience" in the first sense. Tha t is. what we notice and are able to
say about the phenomenon is (relatively) clear, but does not exhaust
the "wholeness" of the experience-we cannot seem to say enough to
do justice to what we "experience" in the second sense of experience.
E(l) is the sense of experience that the preceding analysis of
qualia proposes to physicalize through gradual physical vocabulary
building. E(2) is the sense of experience not fully covered by even the
best physical explanation of the phenomena of perception. We
should be ready to admit that experience in the E(2) sense actually
exists;9 however, does this spell the demise of the possibility of a
physical explanation of our experience?
9 But see Dennett (CE, passim) for plausible evidence thatwe are mistaken abou t
the richness of out perceptual experience. Trying to concede as much as possible to
the pretheoretical notion of experience, I do not argue Dennett's hard line here.
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No. Not all physical objects are the objects of physics. As men
tioned above, physics does not propose to explain the "oceanness" of
ocean waves, or the "lifeness" of living things. If this were the case,
science would have on its hands quite a task: in order to prove itself
"complete" to its critics, it would have to describe the uniqueness of
every possible combination of physical phenomena in the world
everything from "a ruffle-feathered cardinal perched atop the oak
writing desk in the second room on the left" to "the pitted plastic
button on the shirt I wore when I visited the huge mansion on Fourth
Street." Modem physical explanations of these examples-posed in
terms of arrangements of atoms and forces which hold between
them-do not describe the phenomena's richness, but this is some
thing that we can live with. Physics attempts to explain phenomena
in terms of their physical parts, not to describe them in their entirety.
In fact, the simplicity of physical explanation seems to be one of its
most powerful traits. Although rich, vague experience in the E(2)
sense might exist, the fact that it is difficult for physicalist science to
describe this experience takes nothing away from phYSicalism.
Sense two: Interspecies Subjectivity

We have investigated a plausible route for the solution of the
intraspecies subjectivity problem. Strangely, although Nagel seems
at times apprehensive about such a physical, objective account of
human mental states, at times he seems amenable to the idea. Infact,
he even claims that
There is a sense in which phenomenological facts are
perfectly objective: one person can know or say of
another what the quality of the other's experience is
[But], They are subjective ... in the sense that even this
objective ascription of experience is possible only for
someone sufficiently similar to the object of ascrip
tion to be able to adopt his point of view ... (WLB, p.
442).

Remember that the above solution for the intraspecies problem
hinges on the fact that we can know about other members of our
species' experience in virtue of our structural (physical) similarities.
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It seems that Nagel, despite his caveats about the problematic nature

of intraspecies subjectivity, has been ready all along to admit the
possibility for physicalizing human experience in this way. Nagel's
stronger case rests on the problem of interspedes subjectivity.
Without similar physiological structures, it is impossible for one
organism to know "what it is like to be" the other organism, in
Nagel's terms. In perhaps his mostfamous article, "What is it Like to
Be a Bat?" Nagel argues that because humans and other creatures
bats, for example-have wildly different types of perceptual appara
tus, humans cannot in principle know "what it is like to be a bat."
From this observation, the philosopher goes on to argue that
This bears directly on the mind-body problem. For if
the facts of experience-facts about what it is like for
the experiencing organism-are accessible only from
one point of view, then it is a mystery how the true
character of experiences could be revealed in the
physical operation of that organism (WLB, p. 442).
An explanation of bat experience seems to be aU that stands in the
way of a full-blown physicalism,
We can approach the interspecies problem in several ways,
Perhaps the most plausible answer to Nagel's concern that physics
cannot describe "what it is like to be a bat" is to say that physics
actually does describe bat experience in a rough way, This approach
is stressed by Dennett:
[Physiological and behavioral] investigations would
show us a great deal about what a bat could and could
not be conscious of under various conditions, by
showing us what provisions there were in their ner
vous systems for representing this and that, and by
checking experimentally to make sure the bat actu
ally put the information tousein the modulation of Us
behavior (eE, p, 444).
Of course, one could read this approachlO as building directly on
10 Although Dennett would not-remember. he is not a "realist" about our
pretheoretical notions of experience.
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the framework for dealing with intraspecies subjectivity that we
erected in the last section: because humans know what "sensing" is
like-even if humans do not possess a sonar sensory modality
humans can at least understand the rudiments of bat experience. In
this way, humans can use the structural descriptions of bats pro
vided by the sciences of biology and physics to extrapolate from
human experience to bat experience.
But, surely, we still do not know exactly what it is "like" to be a
bat-evenifwe have a rough sense of what it mightbe like. But is this
a problem for physicalism? Is there something in the bat point of
view which physics-as we now understand it-is unable to ex
plain? The answer is both yes and no.
At first glance, there is nothing about physicalism that blocks it
from including bat experience. In fact. deSCriptions of bat physiol
ogy, as Dennett points out, are pretty good rough descriptions of
what it is like to be a bat. However, there is still a difficulty, but the
problem is nothing more (orlessl) than this: Ahumancannotbeabat.
In the end, Nagel's argument against physicalism seems to turn
on this one statement. Indeed, if one has to be a bat in order to know
what it is like to be a bat, and there is no way for a human to be a bat,
we are stuck. But this seems strangely tautological. Ofcourse a human
cannot be a bat! Can a square be a circle? Can a mountain be a lake?
Can a car be a train? In short, Nagel's observation that we cannot
directly know "what bat experience is like" is presupposed by the
very physicalism he thinks problematic. It is a commonly known
axiom of physics (or of logic), after all, that one type of thing cannot
be another at the same time; this is just obvious.
Thus, when we stop to take a good look at Nagel's seemingly
startling observation that in trying to imagine bat consciousness "I
am restricted to the resources of my own mind, and those resources
are inadequate to the task" (WLB, p. 439), we see both that this
statement is tautological and that the best way to explain why our human

minds are inadequate is to use a physical, structural explanation.
Conclusion: A Toast to Physicalism
Through a careful analYSis of Nagel's arguments for the inad
equacy of physicalism, we find that the "problem of subjectivity"
involves not one but several problems, involving various assump
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tions about the character of perceptual phenomena, the claims of
physicalism and the nature of physical explanation. We see that once
our intuitions about the problem of intraspecies subjectivity are
assuaged, the interspecies subjectivity problem seems either dimin
ished or completely misguided.
Thinking of our universe-all of it-in physical terms seems to
hold the most promise for explaining even the most mysterious
phenomena. I hope that this paper serves to help point the way for
physicalism to surmount the difficulties posed by Nagel's analysis of
subjectivity. Here's to the continued success of physicalist explana
tions of the world. ll
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